The link between politics, tactics, strategy, and principles
One of the many discussion topics on our way to the 3rd Congress of the ISL is the importance of electoral processes and what politics to pursue when they take place around the world. There are contributions on this issue already. Particularly, a text presented by comrade Franco Grisolia from Italy, who has written a thorough piece of work with which we agree on many important points, but which also raises some points for debate and clarification. We have also talked with and exchanged ideas on the subject with comrades from the L5I, who contribute with their opinions. At the Congress, we will address the issue in depth, including other opinions and ideas that will also come up on this highly current political issue which expresses different experiences from which we need to draw conclusions.
The ISL Executive Committee is putting this material up for debate. It summarizes our positions on electoral politics, its different tactics, the general political position that works as a starting point, and its link to the revolutionary movement experiences for more than a century regarding electoral processes. We also share our point of view on the issues presented for debate and on the relationship between electoral politics and tactics, revolutionary strategy, and principles.
The context and importance of electoral participation
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the revolutionary movement has developed debates and experiences around electoral participation in bourgeois institutions under different kinds of capitalist regimes. As with other issues, the Bolsheviks developed important initiatives in this field and promoted debates and resolutions on the subject within the Third International after the victory of the Russian Revolution. This experience marks a general political map to follow, always bearing in mind that there can be no exactly identical recipes in different processes and situations. For example, the Bolsheviks carried out different political tactics in the first elections to the Duma, because they considered the circumstances and context of different situations. They boycotted the elections to the 1st Duma when they were called in the midst of a great upsurge in order to divert it. And actively participated in the elections to the Second Duma, when the upsurge had passed and they intervened to spread socialist proposals.
Since then, there have been many experiences and debates, as well as changes. The rise of fascism, then its defeat and the advent of new bourgeois democracies throughout Western Europe. Towards the end of the 20th century we witnessed the fall of the former USSR, the processes of capitalist restoration and the emergence of new regimes where often rigged elections are combined with strong authoritarian governments. In Latin America, decades ago, dictatorships fell and bourgeois democratic regimes emerged, which over time eroded and lost credibility. The Arab Spring also meant the end of dictatorial regimes that had been in place for decades.
In recent years, the world has witnessed a leap in the interimperialist dispute between the US and Western imperialism, in the face of emerging imperialisms like China, followed by Russia. This takes place in a context of systemic crisis, of problems dragging on since the 2008 crisis, plus the failure of bourgeois democratic regimes and their traditional parties, which enabled the emergence of other political experiences. This is now expressed in the rise of the far right, which participates in electoral processes on different continents in a socially and politically polarized world.
We are experiencing a combination of crises in political regimes and massive disappointment with their parliamentary and presidential institutions in very different parts of the world, alongside the continuation of electoral processes in which millions participate in search of some solution or change. In the midst of repeating crises and class struggle processes, it is necessary for us to have adequate politics and tactics to intervene and politically dispute our positions in the vast majority of electoral processes. Without losing sight of the fact that, at the current level of consciousness, in many countries those who have seats in parliaments are still more acknowledged as “real” than those who do not. Therefore, in situations in which we can obtain seats from the left and use them in favor of our strategy, it is always a better option than marginalizing ourselves from that political possibility.
The revolutionary experience, as of the first controversies and political struggles against parliamentarianism and the sectors that adapted to reformist conceptions, was to define positioning electoral processes as a possibility for political dispute and for reaching large sections of the working population, with political agitation, socialist propaganda, and all our class proposals, to help develop our strategy.
We are referring to a tactical political issue, since bourgeois elections are not our strategy or our priority, which is always class struggle. We want to destroy the entire capitalist system and its regimes, including the bourgeois democratic regime. That is why the role of our congress members, where we can have them, is not limited to achieving an occasional partial law in favor of workers, which is good to do whenever possible, but rather to take advantage of every intervention to denounce bourgeois governments and oppositions as a whole and to propagate our fundamental alternative and socialist program. That is why we use elections to forcefully deploy an anticapitalist and socialist politics that questions the entire system and all the parties of the capitalist regime, including the reformists and possibilists.
In 1910, Lenin referred to the way revolutionaries should intervene in elections and said: “The principal question for Social-Democrats who value the elections primarily as a means for the political enlightenment of the people, is, of course, the ideological and political content of all the propaganda and agitation to be carried on in Connection with them. That is what is meant by an election platform. To every party at all worthy of the name a platform is something that has existed long before the elections; it is not something specially devised ‘for the elections’, but an inevitable result of the whole work of the party, of the way the work is organised, and of its whole trend in the given historical period. ” (1)
Independent and class-based electoral politics
For us to make decisions about political, tactical, and electoral intervention, as an aspect that we consider important but not strategic, does not mean that it is alien to our strategy; these are related processes. For this reason, we always carry out electoral politics with complete political independence from our parties, in whatever situation we face. This political, class, and organizational independence is an unwavering principle.
As in all areas of revolutionary political intervention, in elections we also consider the objective situation of each country and the subjective situation, that is, the development and possibilities of our own parties. We also consider whether they take place in imperialist or dependent countries. We cannot make any correct decisions without taking into consideration the combination of all these issues. Nor can correct decisions be made if they are separated from our political strategy. Electoral tactics may vary, but class-based and independent politics is an immutable principle. Without independence, especially if we are part of joint fronts or lists with other forces, we cannot develop thoroughgoing revolutionary politics. That is why it is non-negotiable. We reject any electoral participation that seeks to restrict our socialist and class-based opinions or prevent us from organizing politically.
Another key issue is that we always participate in elections by promoting a socialist and anti-capitalist program that confronts all system parties. Elections are not a place to water down or soften our program, but where we take advantage of an electoral campaign and national political debate to propagate our own program as much as possible. This means that we raise all kinds of partial and specific proposals, always related to denouncing the system as a whole, the need for workers ‘ power and a workers ‘ government, and socialism as the way out. And calling for struggle in the streets for that fundamental political solution.
This is directly related to the need for our political independence. When we run on our own lists, we obviously do so with our complete program and proposals. But in cases where we are part of an electoral front, and the program is correct but perhaps does not contain all the elements we would like, political independence is the guarantee that we can develop other programmatic or political points on our own. Let’s see some current practical examples, both in the NPA-R in France and the FIT-U in Argentina, there is no agreement among all its members on the situation of the war in Ukraine and what politics needs to be adopted. This does not prevent us from being part of both political fronts and their electoral campaigns, nor does it prevent us from openly stating our opinion on the war in Ukraine on our own behalf and in debates and controversy with other left-wing forces. The same thing could happen now with regard to the peace agreement in Gaza or how to achieve Palestinian victory, where there may be different view on characterization, the role of Hamas, and the way out. In a joint electoral campaign, we can campaign in unity for support for Palestine, while at the same time we need to express our opinion without any inconvenience. The same thing could happen with regard to differences on national issues, and in those cases we would also express our opinions.
Our own ballots and left-wing electoral fronts
We participate in electoral processes where we have the possibility with the mentioned political orientation line in each country and spreading our fundamental program. We do so whether with our own ballots or, in some cases, being part of fronts with other forces, under correct anti-capitalist and socialist programs. There are reasonable debates in this PreCongress period regarding whether to prioritize our own lists or participation in fronts. On this issue, we have a different perspective from that expressed in the document presented by comrade Grisolia of the former ITO. He tends to define running our own lists as a general rule or law. We believe that it must be defined differently. First, we must agree that, when we participate in elections, we must be able to fully develop our entire politics and program, with full political independence and at the service of building and strengthening our parties. This objective guides our electoral politics and decision-making, whether it be to form our own ballots or, at times, to participate in fronts. Neither decision is a matter of principle; it is a political decision to be evaluated, according to each situation, considering what best strengthens our objectives.
On the one hand, presenting our own ballots where we have the legal possibility and the strength to do so can be an opportunity to directly and thoroughly spread everything we stand for, with strong political agitation and propaganda based on our socialist ideas, which is positive. At the same time, the possibility of participating in left-wing electoral fronts or coalitions is also a legitimate possibility, provided that doing so contributes to strengthening us politically and strengthening the political presence of our national organizations.
There are diverse experiences around the world, such as that of our comrades in The Struggle, with the People ‘ s Revolutionary Front (PRF) in Kashmir, who have taken advantage of their influence in leading the Student Federation there and run themselves in that region with their own candidates alongside left-wing activists and supporters. There are also other variants that are not exactly the same, but are also positive, such as the comrades of Socialist Alternative in Australia, who, through the construction of The Socialists of Victoria, headed their lists and brought together some sectors and activists. In Argentina, before we joined the FIT-U, we also had our own electoral intervention that allowed us to take space and earn a seat in Córdoba, an important province of Argentina.
Whether we are weak in a country and cannot run on our own, or whether there are multiple left-wing forces and tendencies toward electoral unity that are welcomed by sectors of the vanguard to confront the capitalist parties, the tactic of being part of a front is possible and valid. It is not a rule to be 3 used all the time, but on different occasions it can play a positive role. It can be useful for us to reach large sections of the population with greater strength, in cases in which perhaps, as a small group, we would not be able to reach them on our own. Also, on occasions, a front may be the only way of getting us parliament seats elected. Of course all this can only be positive as long as we have a position within these fronts that allows us to act, that is, for us to be clearly noticeable and able to widely share our socialist and revolutionary proposals.
We must also take into consideration the obstacles imposed by regimes. Sometimes being part of a front helps to overcome them. There are regimes where the requirements for running for office are extremely high, or others where a certain percentage of votes is required to maintain electoral legal acknowledgement, or even higher percentages to be represented in Parliament. In all these cases, it makes sense for participation in fronts to make it a little easier to have an electoral politics that achieves positive objectives.
Having clarified this, there is an essential element to define participation in electoral fronts: we always do so being aware that it is not a strategy but a tactic, and fronts do not last forever. They can be useful to our own construction and strategy for a period of time. When we assess that they cease to be so, that is when we must change that tactic and define another.
Possible fronts and different realities
In relation to electoral fronts, another topic for debate is what type of fronts it is appropriate to participate in. As a starting point: it is correct to be part of a front of class independence, of anti-capitalist and socialist forces with a solid program, and such a front is a priority among our possible electoral options. At the same time, this does not mean that it is the only type of electoral front possible to be part of. There are different expressions and components, crises, ruptures, and shifts to the left. As we mentioned, we must always take into account all objective and subjective assessments.
Of course, we do not encourage our participation in electoral fronts with reformist or progressive politics and programs. Meanwhile, between classical reformism and its main organizations, and anti-capitalist or Trotskyist workers ‘ parties, there are many intermediate variants, sometimes more heterogeneous, with more left-leaning programs, but not as deep or equal to ours. These cases are not the standard regarding our intervention or our electoral priority, and we have to assess them without rejecting outright a possible tactical participation in some cases, always with a clear critical and independent component.
For example, at the time, it was legitimate for a revolutionary current in Greece to be part of the electoral campaign with Syriza, to have candidates in that coalition, and to share our program (and then break away and spread our criticism of their betrayal). Or it was also correct what our comrades in SOL in Spain did, participating tactically in local ballots of the CUP in Barcelona years ago, while continuously debating and arguing about strategic issues with them. Or in recent years in the PSOL in Brazil, where our critical view of the leadership of the front increasingly permeated the campaign, without being able to go beyond that, as there was no other left-wing alternative, nor did we have the strength to apply any other electoral tactic.
When it comes to the issue of fronts and their components, we also take context into consideration. We are not in the period of the Bolsheviks. Then, there was a clear revolutionary force and a Third International with influence and great authority in the face of reformism. Nor is the world populated solely by workers choosing between reformists and revolutionaries, but also by petty-bourgeois variants vying for the working-class and popular base, which in some cases can become somewhat radicalized and gain the support or sympathy of considerable sectors of the working-class vanguard. Currently, there is a huge amount of political diversity, dispersion, new phenomena, and different currents within the broad spectrum of the left, while the revolutionary left is not acknowledged as an alternative. There are even many differences within Trotskyism which is why even a front with only Trotskyists does not guarantee a successful politics. When such unity does occur, there is a great deal of political dispute within it. Therefore, more than ever, we must look at each situation, assess all the political actors involved, and see what is most convenient. Without rejecting outright, as we understand the comrades of the L5I mistakenly believe, in some specific cases we can have tactical electoral participation with some petty-bourgeois variant, located to the left of all the traditional forces of the regime. Provided that we do so with the guarantee of our political and class independence, organizational independence, and by spreading our program.
As part of our political struggle, in places in which we are part of an electoral front, we reject politics that lead to the strengthening of reformist variants. For example, in Brazil, where we participated for years in PSOL electoral campaigns, we believe that it was a serious mistake to allow several clearly reformist currents to join the party. Those currents then took over the leadership of this broad left-wing front and led it on a course of adaptation to the regime and direct collaboration with the PT. As a result, it currently no longer represents anything of its original project nor does it play a positive role nationally. That is why we are evaluating what to do next. Another example is France, where we disagree with and do not support the orientation of the USFI and its sector of the NPA, which tends to strengthen Mélenchon and his La France Insoumise project. We do participate in the NPA-R, which does have an anti-capitalist political position. We also disagree with the divisive, sectarian, and opportunistic orientation of the Trotskyist Faction and its French section.
In Argentina, the situation is different. The FIT-U is an electoral and tactical front of four Trotskyist organizations with agreements and considerable differences between them, in a country with diverse left-wing culture and with the political need to wrest sections of the working class and youth from Peronism. Therefore, our politics is to be part of the Left Front with an anti-capitalist and socialist program and class independence, without allowing reformist currents to enter. At the same time, we propose that it cease to be merely an electoral front and transform itself into something greater, a unified party of the left with freedom of tendencies, that can jointly intervene in the class struggle, building bridges to the participation of independent intellectuals, social leaders, and anticapitalist groups that do not have the possibility of influencing the leadership of the FIT-U, but who can contribute to reaching more sectors and strengthening a left-wing pole against all capitalist forces.
On the critical vote for reformist or nonworking-class forces
There is also another valid debate in our 3rd Congress: can we define a critical vote for reformist working-class-bourgeois, petty-bourgeois or, very exceptionally, bourgeois forces? On this issue, and according to several exchanges we have had, it appears that we have some debates and different opinions with our comrades in the L5I, who do not see this as a possibility. For us, the first definition is that, in general terms, our starting point is voting for our own ballots or for left-wing electoral ballots. That is the general rule for our participation in all first rounds of elections, in places where it is possible to do so because we have the strength and legal capacity to do so, either alone or in agreement with other left-wing forces.
Under this central definition, we believe that there may be specific situations, due to objective and subjective contexts, that enable a critical vote for other forces. In fact, the Bolsheviks did so before and after the Russian Revolution. The Trotskyists did so in Spain, and Lenin advised it in the face of reformist laborism in England so that the working class could gain experience with them, among other examples. In other words, these were and are specific political decisions that do not violate our principles.
It is always essential to start from reality in order to avoid making mistakes. These possibilities may arise in some specific situations, in countries where there is polarization between traditional forces, we have no option of our own, and there may be a more left-wing alternative, without being directly anticapitalist. In these cases, it is possible, if it is useful for our construction, to give a critical vote to that force. As a recent example, in the last US elections, comrades from the former ITO promoted a critical vote for the Greens, in opposition to the two traditional forces of the imperialist regime and in the absence of their own lists and workers ‘ forces running. We considered it was legitimate to accompany them in that decision, in order to have a positive proposal.
Another variant of the critical vote can also occur in regimes where there are second rounds. In these cases, first of all, we are against the politics of regimes that use second rounds to force the entire population to choose between only two forces. We always denounce this. At the same time, bourgeois parties that are essentially similar in their projects often go to second rounds, and that is why in the vast majority of cases we call for not voting for either candidate.
On this basis, in the face of the rise of the far right, there are and will continue to be, in some countries, runoffs between the far-right candidate and another with a more reformist progressive profile. In these cases, the sectors most aligned with the left will not want the far right to win because they see it as an immediate threat to their rights and achievements. How do we engage with this situation in a way that serves our strategy of building a revolutionary party? In such cases, it may be appropriate to vote critically, or to campaign on a negative basis “so that the far right does not win”. This was done in the recent second-round elections in Brazil between Bolsonaro and Lula and the PT, where it was correct to vote critically for Lula, while at the same time clarifying our absolute differentiation from his project.
Of course, this tactical variant requires, as a priority, a very clear political explanation that explicitly differentiates us from that candidate and their party. We do not give them our political support; on the contrary, we explain that we do not support either their program or their project, that if they win we will be their left opposition, and that the dispute of the critical vote is not in support of that candidate, but against the candidate of the extreme right. A different case, but one where a critical vote may also be legitimate, could be in parliamentary elections, for example, in France with the Popular Front.
In all the cases presented here, which are always specific, the political content of our vote is to accompany millions of workers and young people so that the far right does not win; it is support for that need felt by millions. Not to isolate ourselves from that fight and to be seen fighting together, while explaining our program and our way out. Doing this is a tactical political decision and not a matter of principle. What is a matter of principle is not joining bourgeois governments or giving political support to governments of our enemy class. This is something we never do, not even in a runoff election, if we use a critical vote explaining our entire position and differentiation as a political priority.
In relation to bourgeois forces, giving them a critical vote in a second round against a far-right candidate is a debate we have to face. In Argentina, the MST did not support PJ candidate Massa against Milei in the last presidential elections, but emphasized voting against Milei and not placing the two candidates on the same level so as not to break the dialogue with sectors of the working class and those who did not want the far right to win. Our comrades in the PCL in Italy believe that it was necessary to call for a critical vote for Massa. We believe that this is a valid and tactical debate, not one of principles, as we think the L5I also believes. In the face of the advance of the far right, we may be forced to debate this issue in depth in certain very specific places. To be clear, the principle is not to give any political support to non-revolutionary forces, much less to support bourgeois or popular front governments.
Broad parties, entryist tactics, and particular experiences
Along with all these political and electoral variations and decisions, there is another tactic that can be used in different ways, which is a kind of entryism into certain centrist political phenomena, broad parties, or sectors with internal crises and currents within them that can move to the left and on which we want to act. In these cases, where we engage in entryism, the criteria we define for participation in electoral fronts do not apply, but rather those that are possible within the framework of that specific situation. For example, within an entryist tactic, political, class, and organizational independence is also a principle, and we practice it, but it does not apply in 5 the same way, because saying what we think openly, at any time and place, or making our meetings public if the conditions are not right, could lead to our expulsion as soon as we begin to engage in that experience.
So we look for ways to give our opinion and gain influence, based on the reality of that experience. We are talking about entryism in a broad sense, since not all phenomena are the same. We always take into consideration the fact that very different situations take place. In broad party experiences, there may be considerable freedom to move and express our opinions publicly, and in those cases we have to make the most of it. In other variants, structures may be more rigid, and we may need other ways to express our opinions and dispute pro within a period of time.
One example among many is that of American Trotskyism, which, on Trotsky ‘ s advice, entered the Socialist Party. As Cannon describes in a series of lectures, they explained the different ways of developing their politics and organization, taking into account the real conditions of how to do so. We also have more recent experiences, such as our entry in 2007 into the recently founded PSUV of Venezuela during Chávez ‘ s lifetime. At that time, it was a mass party, which in its early days brought together the best of the working class and youth vanguard of the country. Then, Marea Socialista, which had been founded shortly before, decided to tactically join that party, maintaining an independent organization with non-public cadre meetings to prepare their intervention, launching a public newspaper with its positions and cadre meetings that were organized with guiding texts on the situation and on how to act as a current without encouraging individual participation in that experience. (3)
Currently, there are other experiences of entryism in full development and carried out by our comrades in Europe, which will surely be shared at the ISL Congress. We also know that, regarding our participation in broad parties or similar variants, when it comes to electoral campaigns, we can act by promoting the vote for our own candidates, combining this with a critical vote for other candidates. And even in some cases, not campaigning for some candidates. All of this was possible, for example, in the PSOL campaigns, and could have been done in Syriza and other similar phenomena. And it could have been done, for example, in the DSA in the US.
These and other examples will enrich the debate on this type of intervention, which continues to be a necessary tactic in different places and at different times. Specially given that the crisis of parties and regimes is giving rise to new experiences of this kind.
Electoral tactics, party strategy, and class struggle
Regardless of the electoral tactics and politics we define in each country, there is one central issue: electoral intervention, like all political intervention, must serve to build the revolutionary party and advance class struggle. If the tactic is opportunistic, it drags us behind the program of bourgeois or reformist forces, weakening us in our strategy. The same applies for the opposite: if we fail to realize that a good electoral tactic is an opportunity to strengthen our party building, it also weakens us in our strategy, by wasting that opportunity and strengthening reformism and bourgeois forces in another way. We raise a political orientation always related to the strategy of the revolutionary party, by identifying if that electoral tactic will make us grow more or weaken us in our possibilities of building ourselves, making ourselves better known, having more public figures, more political space, and more militants. There is no parameter to take into account that is more definite than this one. At the same time, this same political and tactical orientation must be related to and help advance class struggle in each country. Because an electoral campaign is not a phenomenon that is alien to the more general struggle we always wage against governments, their plans, their parties, and their bureaucracies within the workers ‘ and popular movement.
This relationship between tactics, electoral politics, and strategy is fundamental and decisive. And at the same time, it is not isolated but applied in relation to the situation of class struggle in each country. This has been the case since the first revolutionary experiences. In 1906, Lenin said on this subject: “Hence it follows, firstly, that the participation of the Social-Democrats in the Duma campaign is of a quite different nature from that of other parties. Unlike them, we do not regard this campaign as an end in itself or even as being of cardinal importance. Unlike them, we subordinate this campaign to the interests of the class struggle”. (4)
Seen from another perspective and experience, and thoroughly linking a genuine struggle with elections, Rosa Luxemburg gave this example in Germany: “The current mass struggle for women’s political rights is only an expression and a part of the proletariat’ s general struggle for liberation. In this lies its strength and its future. Because of the female proletariat, general, equal, direct suffrage for women would immensely advance and sharpen the proletarian class struggle. That is why bourgeois society detests and fears women’s suffrage, and that is why we want to win it and will win it. And through the struggle for women’s suffrage we will hasten the hour when the present society falls in ruins under the hammer blows of the revolutionary proletariat”. (5)
The same applies to the relationship between the peasant struggle in Spain and the elections. There, Trotsky explained it with extreme clarity, providing the whole issue with political unity: “For a certain time, all the questions of the Spanish revolution will in one way or another be refracted through the prism of parliamentarism. The peasants will wait with the greatest anxiety for what the Cortes will say about the agrarian question. Is it hard to understand what significance a Communist agrarian program unfolded from the tribune of the Cortes might have under present conditions? For this, two conditions are required: One must have an agrarian program and one must gain access to the parliamentary tribune. The Cortes will not solve the land question, this we know. The fighting initiative of the peasant mass itself is required. But for such an initiative the masses need a program and a leadership. The tribune of the Cortes is needed by the Communists as a bond with the masses. And from this bond will develop actions which will flow over the head of the Cortes. Here lies the essence of the revolutionary-dialectical relationship towards parliament”. (6)
To give another example, PST of Argentina, in the 1970s, facing its first major national election against Peronism during 6 Perón ‘ s lifetime and other bourgeois variants, expressed the following in an internal document: “The propaganda of a revolutionary party for the elections has three objectives that can be summarized in one: to develop and strengthen the party. The first objective is to unmask and denounce the regime. In this case, the semi-colonial and capitalist regime that oppresses the country and exploits the workers. The second objective is to show the working class that the solution to its problems comes from its mobilizations and not from possible parliamentary or electoral activity. We must show the falseness of bourgeois democracy and show the working class how only the activity and unity of the exploited can liberate workers. The third objective is to demonstrate the necessity of the workers ‘ and socialist revolution, how the working class must take power as the only way to overcome the crisis of the country and the workers”. (7)
All these examples and others prove to be useful today because there are different sectors of the left that are under pressure and have adapted to bourgeois-democratic regimes, an adaptation that increases and manifests itself more strongly when there is a combination of some good electoral results and a weak revolutionary theoretical and political structure. This gives rise to electoralism, parliamentary deviations, and tendencies to try to please sections of the population above the need for a confrontational revolutionary policy. Even in this adaptation, a differentiation arises between the tasks of an electoral campaign and the needs of the class struggle, which must always be a priority. There is, for example, the case of the Trotskyist Fraction of the PTS in Argentina, which sometimes argues that if there were a few more left-wing congress members, this or that could be achieved in Parliament. Or in the recent electoral campaign in Argentina, during which neither the PTS nor the PO sent any of their candidates to the Global Sumud Flotilla, unlike the ISL and its Argentine party did during the same campaign.
Clarifying this issue and the relationship between election processes and political and class struggle is really very important. It is also important to be clear that the relationship between electoral participation and class struggle has its differences in terms of objectives and politics. In the class struggle against right-wing, extreme right-wing, or any government that implements austerity and austerity plans, we are for the United Front for the struggle for workers ‘ and popular demands, with demands and denunciations of all reformism and union bureaucracies affiliated with bourgeois opposition parties. But we do not carry this broad unity for the struggle over to the electoral political arena or to the construction of political alternatives, because that would be opportunism. In the political and electoral struggle, we confront all bourgeois and reformist variants, including union or social leaders who sometimes share mobilizations with us, but we denounce them if they support or participate in bourgeois or reformist electoral lists that are contrary to ours. This also starts with demanding that those worker’s leaders who are part of the united front not support bourgeois candidates in the elections. When we find this situation and an electoral variant outside the bosses ‘ parties emerges, we can intervene, since it would be an electoral variant that goes in the direction of class independence.
Conclusions
Based on what we have stated in this material and in the debates we will have in the 3rd Congress of the ISL sessions, we believe it is necessary for all our members to be trained in the general political outlines of electoral intervention and in the specific relationship they have with our revolutionary strategy. Starting from the reaffirmation that electoral processes are an important tactical issue for us and often a great political opportunity to put ourselves forward and grow as a party, strengthening our strategy. Provided that we do so in a way that is related to and not separate from the needs of intervention in the class struggle. And being aware that this does not eliminate the possibility that in some cases we may choose not to participate, or denounce a call by an authoritarian regime, as we did, for example, in the last elections in Venezuela. Although these examples are few and far between, we mostly seek ways to be part of the processes in order to develop all our opinions and proposals.
That is why we continue to believe in what Leon Trotsky said amid the controversies surrounding the Spanish Revolution: “Parliamentary cretinism is a detestable disease, but antiparliamentary cretinism is not much better.” Let us make full use of all the political and electoral opportunities that are opening up for us in the midst of the global capitalist crisis. Without ever separating them from our strategic objectives, but rather linking them to the need to strengthen our parties and make them grow, which is the only real way to know if a political decision is positive and correct. And all this with our principles clear, which in this and in all areas of revolutionary politics, it is essential to keep in mind and defend. (8)
Adopted by the III World Congress of the ISL
REFERENCES
(1) The Election Campaign and the Electoral Platform, Lenin, 1910
(2) “We began our work very modestly and according to a plan. Our first instruction to the comrades was: join the organization, join the party, throw yourselves into militant work — and thus win a certain moral authority in relation to cadres and the rank-and-file; make personal friendships, especially with active elements who might later prove useful. Our plan was to let political events unfold normally, as we expected they would. We did not intend to force the discussion or artificially provoke factional struggles”. (Lectures on “The History of American Trotskyism, ” James Cannon, 1942)
(3) “Ahead lie months in which the masses and the vanguard moving toward the PSUV will take action, express their opinions, and become angry at every sign of bureaucracy. We see this as a great opportunity to influence, to converge with sectors, to fight battles alongside the best of the Bolivarian process. Those who, seeing only the bureaucratic and controlling aspect, lose sight of the central issue are mistaken: the weight of the revolutionary process and the intervention of 7 the masses in the construction of their own party. We are confident in this, not because they can change the character of the party, but because of the possibility of connecting, organizing, and building a great current within it today, and in the future we will see where… We will assess the situation, preparing ourselves for strong clashes with the structure of its leadership. We are heading towards a disharmonious space, where they will exclude us and try to silence our opinions… Specifically, we propose to begin acting within the PSUV, doing so as an organized current. We do not promote individual participation, but rather collective, organized participation with a common strategy “. (Marea Socialista de Venezuela, 10 contributions on the PSUV and our policy, May 4, 2007)
(4) Social Democracy and Electoral Agreements, Lenin, 1906
(5) Women ‘ s Suffrage and the Class Struggle. Speech given by Rosa Luxemburg at the Second Conference of Social Democratic Women. Stuttgart, May 12, 1912)
(6) The Spanish Revolution and the Dangers Threatening It, Leon Trotsky, 1931
(7) Document voted on at the Congress of the PST of Argentina, in 1972
(8) The Spanish Revolution and the Dangers Threatening It, Leon Trotsky, 1931
