By Martin Suchanek
It wasn’t just the Left Party that was eagerly awaiting the party conference. It ended up being a political success for the Center, led by Ines Schwerdtner, as evidenced not only by the review of the resolutions but also by the election of the executive committee.
With 85.7%, Schwerdtner achieved a better result in the presidential election than she did at the party’s last convention. In the coming months, she will have a decisive influence on the party’s image and strategy, though this will not be without internal contradictions. In the executive committee and the expanded board, she has a majority in favor of her political line.
Following Jan van Aken’s departure, Schwerdtner is de facto the sole leader of the Karl Liebknecht House. The new co-chair, Pantisano, can be satisfied with having been elected with 53% of the vote, though it is questionable whether he will remain in office for much longer. However, compared to Schwerdtner, the parliamentary group leaders Reichinnek and Pellmann are also taking a back seat. This was immediately apparent at the party convention, where Schwerdtner and van Aken played an incomparably more active role in the debate and helped secure majorities for the executive committee.
Why was the center successful?
The success of the left-wing reformist faction was not a foregone conclusion, although it had always been likely. After all, there was no clearly defined and influential alternative—whether from the left or the right—to its policies and strategy. But the majorities at the party convention were unclear. After all, it was the first such congress since the massive increase in membership to around 125,000 today, for which delegates had just been elected and at which the party’s political position remained open. Approximately half of those present were attending this meeting for the first time.
Many of these delegates were further to the left than the executive committee, though this was due more to their emotional and bad-tempered nature than to any specific theoretical or practical concept. They were to the left of the executive committee on political issues—for example, on Palestine, the glorification of the EU as a “potential force for peace,” anti-militarism, or the question of government—but at the same time, their voting behavior also fluctuated. Furthermore, the undemocratic leadership of the party convention sparked discontent among many of these delegates (though not only among them). In general, it can be said that, especially on the first day, it was possible to secure majorities on procedural issues against the party convention’s script, and in critical votes, 30–40 percent sometimes voted to the left of the majority.
But in the end, the center prevailed on almost every issue. This was due not only to its own strength, but also to its ability to form a bloc with large parts of the right wing as well as with part of the left wing (for example, Baden-Württemberg, LINKS*KANAX). This alliance now spans nearly the entire political spectrum. Thus, the Center was able to prevail on almost every political issue.
However, the leadership around Schwerdtner also emerged stronger after the party convention because it has a goal and a strategy that represent a real change for Die Linke ahead of its resurgence. Its goal is to transform Die Linke into an “organizing class party”—that is, an organization with deep social and organizational roots in the unions, in the workplaces, and in the neighborhoods. This focus on winning over the working class and anchoring it in the party’s organization played no role previously and was rejected by Wagenknecht and the government socialists. Fortunately, the Wagenknecht wing is a thing of the past, and the party’s right wing does not dare to openly attack the concept at this time.
But this path toward a stronger foothold within the working class around social issues and campaigns is by no means free of contradictions. In terms of foreign policy, it runs counter to the pressure to conform to bourgeois society. At the same time, the parties’ electoral successes and the rise of the AfD raise the question of governance.
This also reveals the internal contradiction of left-wing reformism, which, although more class-oriented, remains reformism—bourgeois workers’ politics. This contradiction is expressed both in the party congress resolutions and in the party’s perspectives.
Middle East/West Asia
The resolution “For Equal Rights in the Middle East/West Asia—Against All Racism and Anti-Semitism” was adopted by a majority vote. It was there that the most visible clash with the left took place. For example, the motion by the BAG Palestine received 30% of the votes, a respectable success given the bureaucratic and partisan makeup of the presidium. This shows that the left has considerable potential. But even though the party has shifted its stance on Palestine for the better, its basic line remains the same. It continues to defend the right of the racist Zionist state of Israel to exist and refuses to recognize the Palestinian people’s right to armed resistance against genocide. Although the draft from the party’s executive committee included more than 100 changes, little has changed in substance.
Introductory Movement
The main motion, “Building the Left Like a Stone House,” was also adopted. Despite many changes, the content of the original draft has been preserved in its entirety. As with the resolution on Palestine, the discussion was steered in the interests of the board. For example, in the “open” debate, where speakers were actually selected by lottery, an entire row simply “took their seats” and thus cut in front of the “regular” delegates selected by lottery. This disadvantaged critical voices. But the debate was also curtailed on key controversial issues, such as the topic of the “European Union,” through block voting on amendments proposed by the Motions Committee. A procedural motion to open the debate was rejected, albeit by a narrow majority. For example, there were no speeches or rebuttals on many central controversial issues, and there were no individual votes.
As for the content, the main motion that was adopted, as well as the one on the Middle East/West Asia, are therefore based on the draft. In the run-up to the party convention, we subjected both to detailed scrutiny, so we will only touch on them briefly here.
But it is important to note that at the party convention, some of the party’s major fundamental political errors were reaffirmed in the main resolution, which was codified to a certain extent.
The motion denounces the militarization of the EU and its imperialist orientation. But that same capitalist union will become a force for peace, as if by some miracle: “The alternative to a major military power like the EU also lies in a conscious self-limitation to a constructive force for peace and a shift toward the Global South.” In other words, a strategic alliance should be built between smaller states and the major powers of the Global South and Europe to counterbalance the United States, China, and Russia. Such sleight of hand merely glorifies the politics of European imperialism—and at the same time issues a blank check for an “alternative” security and defense policy, which is, of course, purely defensive.
In some places, the main motion states that the issue of distribution and ownership must be addressed. However, in reality, Die Linke only raises the issue of redistribution and relies on a Keynesian left-reformist model to address the capitalist crisis. However, this fails to recognize the real causes of the crisis, making it illusory from a strategic standpoint. At the same time, it explains why “reformist governments”— that is, bourgeois governments, would be the key path to “taming” capitalism through state intervention and redistribution in order to improve the social situation of all wage earners, halt the shift to the right, and also take steps toward the democratization of the economy.
A Matter of Government
Based on this reformist strategy, the path to government participation is a logical one. In Berlin, a “red metropolis” will be created following the state elections this fall, and Elif Eralp will be the governing mayor. Wisely, the party is not making too many promises during the election campaign because, after all, it does not want to jeopardize the project’s success by setting the bar too high. It is already clear that another round of a coalition government with the SPD and the Greens in Berlin will lead to a disaster similar to all previous attempts to co-manage the misery: frustration, aversion, and disappointment—and the strengthening of the AfD.
To prevent the AfD from gaining power, Die Linke promises to mobilize against the right and defend the social and political interests of all wage earners and all the oppressed. That sounds good. But the “anti-fascist struggle” also includes, in the main motion, entering into a coalition government with the CDU if necessary or supporting such a government in parliament to prevent an alliance between the CDU and the AfD. The entire internal and untenable contradiction of this position was expressed—certainly unintentionally—by the new chairman, Pantisano. On June 19, he explained in an interview with ZDF that he was also in favor of a coalition with the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt to block the AfD. The next day, he told the newspaper Bild that there was “no difference between the CDU, which pursues fascist policies, the AfD, or the fascists themselves.” What’s going on? The fact that Pantisano publicly apologized to the CDU after the party convention doesn’t make things any better—it’s just more opportunistic.
As for the stance toward a possible “anti-fascist” government led by the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt, the right prevailed—and not just in terms of substance. The critical motions put forward by the AKL and the PCF were rejected on the grounds that one should not “generally” distrust comrades on the right wing of the party (who, incidentally, should not be called that). Of course, this is demagogic nonsense. First, representatives of the Left Party in state governments have shown time and again that they are willing to vote for billions in loans to the Bundeswehr for rearmament, for example, when it comes to voting for billions in loans for rearmament, in order to maintain the coalition with the SPD and the Greens in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania or Bremen. Second, these fundamental issues should be decided by the party as a whole, not just at the local level.
Because, whether you like it or not, any government participation or tolerance toward the CDU at the state level will inevitably undermine the campaign against the social cuts and militarization promised by the party. The same is true of a coalition with the SPD, the Greens, and Berlin. At the same time, you cannot co-manage capitalism—for example, by implementing the reactionary tightening of federal laws—and at the same time wage the class struggle against capital and the government. This social-democratic fairy tale doesn’t get any better when the Left Party spins it as a fairy tale about the “rebellious government,” the “red metropolis,” or the “anti-fascist” firewall.
The campaign against social cuts and militarization
But the success of the party’s new leadership is not without its contradictions. While the right wing was given free rein on government policy vis-à-vis the CDU as the price for forming a bloc, the party convention passed the resolution “Against Social Cuts and Militarization” to bring together the forces to the left of Schwerdtner.
In the text, the party promises to mobilize against the all-out attack on all levels and firmly declares: “We are organizing the uprising: against social cuts and militarization.” The “2030 Agenda” is rightly understood as the greatest attack since the 2010 Agenda—in fact, an even more comprehensive one. The goal is “a cascade of protests against social cuts, ranging from local actions to regional alliances and nationwide demonstrations.” Furthermore, “the connection between social cuts, rearmament, and militarization should also be addressed proactively and publicly.”
This campaign must be driven by all leftists inside and outside the Left Party, and all militant trade unionists. We need a movement like this against the broad-based attack (and it must also ultimately put the question of massive political strikes—including a general strike against the 2030 Agenda—on the agenda). The fact that Die Linke (and, even more tentatively, the unions as well) are addressing this issue is a step in the right direction, despite all the hesitation so far. Furthermore, such a movement and mass mobilization make it harder to sell out to the government, harder to settle for half-hearted compromises in a coalition with the SPD and the Greens, and harder to tolerate or even co-govern with the CDU. This internal contradiction within the party congress resolutions—ultimately an internal contradiction within the entire left-wing reformist strategy—must be sharpened by the left wing within Die Linke.
As previously noted in considering the key outcomes of the party congress, the party itself operates within the contradictions of left-wing reformism, specifically the concept of the organizing class party. On the one hand, this represents a reaction to the changing political situation, insofar as it seeks to anchor the party more deeply as an organization of hope among wage earners and within social movements. At the same time, this must be done without revolutionarily challenging capitalism and the bourgeois state itself; the party must be rooted in the unions and workplaces, but without challenging their bureaucratic apparatus.
The party as a whole is rife with contradictions. Ultimately, this contradiction can only be resolved through reformist means by consolidating the party as SPD 2.0. But at the same time, the pace and direction of this development remain uncertain in the short term. Class struggle, as well as internal party disputes, may lead to further growth of the party, but they may also break this trend, especially if the party commits an open betrayal of the governments in the eyes of significant sectors of the working class. It will also be decisive how the left engages with the left in this contradictory process.
The Left on the Left
At the party convention, the views of the left and minority groups were evident, but in the end, the center prevailed. In doing so, it relied on its control of the party convention and did not shy away from undemocratic maneuvers. But it would also be self-deception to assume that the majorities would have changed fundamentally with a more democratic and comprehensive discussion. The leftists in Die Linke—that is, those forces that clearly want to go beyond left-wing reformism—are ultimately a minority within the party, and a significantly smaller minority than the one-third who followed this line on individual issues.
The elections to the executive board illustrate this. There, the left-wing reformists led by Schwerdtner hold a majority. However, the right wing constitutes a considerable minority, which is undoubtedly larger than its percentage of membership. The radical left—that is, groups that generally advocate anti-capitalist, socialist, or even revolutionary positions—is completely absent from the council. Ultimately, not a single person represents it, which marks a decline compared to the previous period, when the AKL was represented, though the party’s executive committee was also significantly larger.
The “left within the left” does not represent a unified current, but rather several different ideological currents, which are also organizationally fragmented. It ranges from left-wing reformist forces such as the “Socialist Left” (SL) to centrist and revolutionary currents.
Consequently, they are essentially united only by their opposition to the right, to the ruling Socialists, to anti-German and Zionist forces, their refusal to conform to the EU, and also by the right and the center’s alignment with a “defensive strategy” for Germany, in which militarism must be limited to a “structural capacity for non-aggression.” Opinions differ regarding their attitude toward the left-reformist leadership, both tactically and strategically. Essentially, this applies to almost all major political issues.
Thus, assessments of the global situation differ fundamentally. Some assume that we are living in a period of struggle over the redistribution of the world among the old and new imperialist great powers, while others deny that China and Russia are imperialist at all. This also leads to different positions, for example, on Iran and Ukraine, on Venezuela and Cuba, but also on Palestine with regard to the two-state or one-state solution and the legitimacy of armed resistance.
Therefore, it is also utopian to think that the entire left wing of Die Linke can agree on a common strategy or a common platform. But it can and must act jointly against pacts with the CDU in the name of “anti-fascism,” against the government socialists, and also against rotten government agreements with the SPD and the Greens. And it can and must make agreements to push Die Linke to the left and toward greater activism on issues of struggle such as Palestine and in campaigns against the 2030 Agenda and against rearmament and militarization.
But it also requires a political debate and coordination among those forces that want to take active and organized action against the party’s reformist orientation. Otherwise, the “radical left” will remain unintentionally fragmented. Therefore, as the group Arbeiter:innenmacht, we also support the “Call for a New Socialist Network on the Left.”
The responsibilities of this division should be:
- actively support existing activities and campaigns and also set its own priorities;
- within Die Linke, to promote the development of grassroots class-struggle structures and working groups;
- actively promote Marxist education and educational work;
- A programmatic debate on an action plan to organize and advance an alternative program to reformism, with the aim of being able to contribute to the programmatic debate with an alternative.
But this also requires that we ourselves make progress in building a revolutionary current so that we can play a role in the struggle between socialist and anti-reformist currents, as well as within the party as a whole.
