This article proposes an interpretation of the Spanish Revolution centered on the role of worker and peasant mobilization, collectivization, and the clash between revolution and counterrevolution. In contrast to interpretations that attribute the defeat to revolutionary radicalism, it vindicates the experience of popular power and questions the role played by reformist and Stalinist forces in its dismantling. It reaffirms the relevance of Trotskyist concepts based on one of the most profound revolutions of the 20th century.

By Gérard Florensonand Rubén Tzanoff

Automatic translation made by AI.

The military uprising did not come out of the blue

The coup of July 18, 1936, had been in the works for months, probably even before the^{Popular Front’s1}electoral victory—or, at the very least, immediately after it. A conspiracy involving a large number of officers could hardly remain completely clandestine, but the government—and first and foremost the President of the Republic, Manuel Azaña—though it alluded to rumors, turned a deaf ear to the warnings of the generals loyal to him. Was it the inefficiency of its intelligence services? Fascist infiltration within its ranks? All of this is likely, but this blindness on the part of the Popular Front’s leaders was due above all to their illusions about the virtues of bourgeois democracy and their confidence in the loyalty of the military. Years later, the Chilean people would experience the same scenario firsthand when Salvador Allende appointed Pinochet—his future executioner—as commander-in-chief of the Chilean Armed Forces. Azaña trusted in the loyalty of the generals and chiefs of staff appointed by his government, but although most did indeed refuse to join the uprising (and Franco subsequently carried out a bloody purge within their ranks), the mood was different among the young officers trained in the military academies, who were heavily influenced by the fascist ideas of the^Falange.² Furthermore, among the commanding officers—most of whom came from the propertied classes, many belonging to the landowning aristocracy, the “hidalgos”^3—there was no shortage of monarchists and ultra-Catholics, hostile to the “atheist republic,” who hoped for a “pronouncement” that would restore the throne to the king, reestablish the old, immutable order, and return the Church’s prerogatives to it. Azaña also failed to appreciate the extent to which Franco controlled the forces stationed in Morocco—forces that would prove decisive for the success of the rebellion.

And this criminal blindness on the part of the government persisted even after the uprising—which was viewed as a venture doomed to rapid failure (much like Sanjurjo’s lamentable attempt in 1932)^⁴—a revolt that would soon be crushed by loyalist forces.

Fortunately, the working class grasped the gravity of the situation more quickly, but the government refused to distribute weapons, thereby hindering the response and bearing responsibility for numerous casualties among the workers. Furthermore, the widespread illusions about the officers’ supposed loyalty allowed some of them to deceive union leaders regarding their intentions; these leaders believed they could redeploy their forces elsewhere, which led, among other things, to the defeats at Zaragoza and Oviedo, strongholds of the National Confederation of Labor (CNT)^⁵.

From Resistance to Revolution

Unlike Mussolini and Hitler, the rebel military officers could not rely on a long-established, well-organized political party. The Falange, founded in 1933 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera and espousing Italian fascism, was a small, violent organization, incomparable to the forces of^{the Fascio},⁶ non-existent on the electoral scene, and one that would only develop during the Civil War to counterbalance the influence of the monarchists. Nor does it appear that there were any organic ties to the CEDA, Gil Robles’s ultra-reactionary party. The future insurgents had the support of certain sectors of finance capital, but at first the major capitalist groups ignored them. Instead, they enjoyed the backing of the large landowners and the Catholic hierarchy. It was really the military that organized and directed the operation. However, wherever they triumphed or appeared to be on the verge of doing so, the reactionary forces immediately reared their heads, attacked the workers’ and popular movements, and called into question social and democratic gains. In numerous towns, local strongmen attempted to regain power, with the enthusiastic support of the priests, and clashed with popular resistance. Often, guns did the talking, and in regions where they could not expect help from fascist troops, the bourgeoisie and landowners fled, abandoning their homes and lands. The class struggle, out in the open and in all its intensity, spread throughout both the villages and the cities.

It soon became clear that the coup had failed in most of the major cities, either because the rebellious military had been defeated by the workers—especially in Madrid and Barcelona—or because, as happened in Valencia, the garrison refrained from rising up for fear of suffering the same fate. The victory belonged to the workers, to the organized working class, which initially fought almost unarmed and later took up weapons seized from arsenals and police stations, until the government, cornered, had to resign itself to arming the people. Undoubtedly, in the cities where the police and the Civil Guard refused to support the insurgents, their contribution was valuable because they were armed and trained, but without the popular mobilization they would have been unable to confront the garrison.

Everywhere the fascists were defeated, their defeat meant victory for the working class and the other popular classes: poor peasants, day laborers, and small artisans. They now had weapons and were not willing to easily hand them back to a government that had shown itself to be indecisive and powerless.

The most striking feature was the power vacuum—both political and economic—that existed in the cities and in the countryside. A race then began to fill that vacuum, which could lead either to the reconstruction of the structures of the bourgeois state or to a government of the workers and the people, capable of reorganizing the economy on new, non-capitalist foundations and of mobilizing the population, even on the military fronts, against the fascist reaction that sought to restore the old order—that of the exploiters and oppressors.

Collectivization, emergency measures, and systemic change

Collectivization undoubtedly marked the uniqueness of the Spanish Revolution. While the various anarchist factions defended them in a way that left little room for critical reflection, they were, on the other hand, the target of attacks by bourgeois Republicans, reformists, and, above all, Stalinists, all of whom were determined to put an end to them. For those who proclaimed that it was necessary to win the war first before making the revolution (and who ended up losing both), this power of the associated producers was intolerable. It is well known how the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), under Líster’s leadership, dismantled the collectives in Aragon by returning the land to its former owners, and the same methods were employed throughout the Republican zone. Under the pretext of controlling possible deviations, the collectivized enterprises were placed under the tutelage of the bourgeois state in the process of reconstruction (in Catalonia, the Generalitat), while the police and the army once again came under its control. Without losing sight of the limitations of collectivization—namely, self-management without centralized planning, with the risk of competition between enterprises—we defend this experience of workers’ and peasants’ power, which unfolded in an extremely difficult context and was too brief to allow for a definitive assessment.

The collectivizations were a response to a situation in which many business and land owners had been imprisoned or had fled to Francoist-controlled territory or abroad. In fact, though not legally, their property belonged to the people, who had to put it to productive use to ensure their own survival. In the countryside, it was necessary to secure the harvests, prepare the fields, and plan for future plantings. In the factories, production could not be interrupted indefinitely. In the neighborhoods, it was essential to ensure a steady supply of goods, since large-scale commerce had broken down. A multitude of collectives and committees were able to rise to the challenge. Day laborers and small farmers cultivated abandoned land, mechanized and streamlined production, meeting food needs while also opening schools and medical clinics. Although the CNT was often the driving force behind this process, the rank-and-file members of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the General Union of Workers (UGT) also mobilized.

The revolution was not a utopia: it was underway, but so was the counterrevolution

Ninety years after the fascist coup d’état and the start of the Spanish Revolution, following Franco’s victory and the years of dictatorship, much has been written about these events. The responsibility of the so-called democracies for their non-intervention—which gave Hitler and Mussolini free rein—has been highlighted. But numerous historians, drawing on the accounts of reformists and Stalinists, have also emphasized the divisions within the “Republican camp,” accusing the revolutionaries (anarchists, Trotskyists, and the^POUM⁷) of having weakened the war effort due to their alleged doctrinal intransigence. None, however, revive the Stalinist thesis of“Franco’s agents”…

We, of course, have a very different interpretation. Largo Caballero and Companys were likely reformists who believed it was possible to bring about social change in stages, the first of which was winning the war to defend democracy against fascism. But what distanced them from the concrete revolution that had already begun in Spain was their willingness to offer guarantees to the “democratic” imperialist governments of France, England, and even the United States. Enough with the slander: we are not “reds”; we respect property, starting with that of foreign capitalists. To prove their respectability, it was necessary to disarm the revolution. And what neither the PSOE—including its right wing—nor the ERC could do—that is, physically eliminate the revolutionaries and destroy the collectives—was carried out by the Stalinists, who placed themselves at the service of the property-owning petty bourgeoisie to eradicate the gains of the revolution. As former leaders of the PCE and the^PSUC⁸ have testified, their parties were in reality led by cadres of the^Comintern⁹, serving Stalin’s foreign policy, which at that time sought to win the favor of the “democracies.”

“Those who make half-hearted revolutions are merely digging their own graves.”

The title of this section is a quote from Antoine de Saint-Just dating from 1793 that is relevant to the Spanish Revolution. The purpose of this article is not to argue with the CNT leaders who had become “comrade ministers.” Their capitulation to the leaders of the Popular Front and their betrayal in May 1937 in Catalonia did not, however, spare them from persecution by the Stalinists. The POUM’s mistakes, its sometimes dramatic vacillations, and its subordination to the CNT are also part of the assessment, but we do not confuse them with the gravediggers of the Spanish Revolution: the reformists and the Stalinists who, by breaking the revolutionary momentum and its initial gains, opened the door to Franco.

The Relevance of Trotskyist Concepts

Franco’s coup led not only to a civil war between two armies, but also to a social revolution that gave rise to dual-power structures and experiments in workers’ control. Franco did not triumph because he was militarily superior from the outset, but because the Republican and Stalinist leadership dismantled the revolutionary power that the masses had created. The Popular Front was the main obstacle to the revolution, because it subordinated the working class to the Republican bourgeoisie.

The CNT squandered a historic opportunity by refusing to seize power, which was in the hands of the workers’ organizations. The POUM, which denounced Stalinism, wavered between the revolution and the Popular Front—with which it never completely broke—and failed to develop an independent political line capable of challenging the leadership of the masses. In short, we uphold the central aspects of Leon Trotsky’s ideas as set forth in his writings on the Spanish Revolution between 1931 and 1939.

War cannot be separated from social revolution:“The civil war can only be won through social revolution. Whoever pits war against revolution will lose both the war and the revolution.” ThePopular Frontpolicyleads to failure:“The Popular Front is the main cause of Spain’s defeat. The policy of class collaboration paralyzes the proletariat and ensures the triumph of reaction.”Both statements were made in “The Lesson of Spain: A Final Warning” (1937).

And the decisive crisis is the absence of revolutionary leadership:“The Spanish masses possessed all the necessary conditions for victory, except for revolutionary leadership.”Class, Party, and Leadership. Why Was the Spanish Proletariat Defeated?* (1940, written in 1939). These are conclusions about one of the most profound workers’ and peasants’ revolutions of the 20th century, which remain fully relevant to the current politics and orientation of revolutionary socialists.

Unfinished Democratic and Social Tasks

The successful coup, the 36 years of Francoism, and its legitimization through the transition and the subsequent democracy up to the present day make it clear that many tasks remain unfinished. The crimes of the Franco regime and the transition remain unpunished; the perpetrators were never tried or punished. Parties such as the PSOE, PP, Vox, Sumar, PCE, Podemos, and the regional parties have done everything possible to turn the page and defend the 1978 parliamentary regime, or act as its “critical” partners when it comes to curtailing democratic freedoms and denying the self-determination of the Catalan, Basque, Galician, and other nationalities.

Socially, the capitalist system they saved has continued to face crisis after crisis, causing social inequalities, exploitation, and growing poverty—especially since the systemic crisis that erupted in 2008 and which they have still not managed to resolve. And, in the face of the rise of the far right, there is renewed talk of the Popular Front and reformist alternatives as a “lesser evil”—always within the capitalist system—which leads to a dead end.

The great task of building a new revolutionary leadership to fight for the Socialist Revolution—alongside the workers’ and popular movements and the organs of dual power that it builds—remains pending. The unfolding of the Catalan rebellion for self-determination has once again demonstrated that class conciliation and reformist and nationalist leaderships are an obstacle to freedom and socialism. In the face of the debacle of the PSOE and the reformists who whitewash its image, there is a great opportunity to put forward a political alternative that can only be seized through the convergence of the radical left, with a principled program and the national and international regrouping of revolutionaries.

1. Popular Front:An electoral coalition formed in Spain in January 1936 by left-wing republican, socialist, and communist parties, as well as other anti-fascist forces, to run in the February elections of that year. Its electoral victory led to the formation of the last government of the Second Republic before the military coup of July 1936.

2. Falange:A Spanish fascist political organization founded in 1933 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera. It advocated for a national-syndicalist, authoritarian, and anti-communist state. During the Civil War, it became one of the main political pillars of the pro-Franco faction.

3. Hidalgos:Members of the Spanish lower nobility, exempt from certain taxes and holding honorary privileges, though not necessarily wealthy. The term is also used to refer to the lower nobility in Spain during the Old Regime.

4. Sanjurjo’s Attempt:A failed coup d’état led by General José Sanjurjo on August 10, 1932, against the Second Republic. Its failure temporarily strengthened the republican regime, although Sanjurjo later participated in the military conspiracy of 1936.

5. CNT:Spain’s leading anarcho-syndicalist union and one of the most important workers’ organizations during the Spanish Revolution.

6. Fascio:Italian term (plural: fasci) for the political organizations that gave rise to the Fascist movement led by Mussolini. By extension, the term is used to refer to Fascist groups, especially in interwar Italy.

7.- POUM:Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification, a revolutionary organization founded in 1935 through the merger of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Bloc and the Communist Left of Spain. It was critical of the Communist International’s policies under Stalinism. .

8.- PSUC:Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, a Catalan communist party founded in July 1936 through the unification of several socialist and communist organizations. It was affiliated with the Communist International.

9. Comintern:The name by which the Third International is known. From the late 1920s onward, it came under Stalin’s control and was dissolved in 1943.

Updated: July 21, 2026