Martin Suchanek/Jaqueline Katherina Singh

The election result in Saxony-Anhalt, has spread consternation across the whole of the German Left. Yet consternation is of no help after such a defeat. “Not to mock,  not to hate, but to understand”, advised the philosopher Spinoza and certainly understanding is what is needed if we are to draw political lessons from the AfD’s victory.

We cannot continue pretending that the right wing can be stopped by appeals to the ‘firewall’, that is, the promise from other parties not to collaborate with the AfD in office. Likewise, invoking the ‘unity of democrats’, or supporting CDU governments ‘against fascism’, let alone calling for a ban by the Constitutional Court, will get us nowhere.

On  the contrary, such tactics divorce the struggle against the AfD from the struggle against the government and the capitalist crisis. In effect, it would mean relying on precisely those parties that are driving through cuts to social services, rearmament and isolationism. That has not stopped the AfD. Rather, it has contributed to the far right becoming stronger.

A predictable shift to the right

First of all, let us look at the election result itself. On a turnout of 77.8 per cent, more than in any other state election, the AfD won 43.8 per cent, leaving it just three seats short of an outright majority. A dramatic, but by no means surprising, victory: for weeks, the right-wing populist, racist party had been polling over 40 per cent. In the new state parliament, the AfD thus holds 39 of the 83 seats, the CDU secured 15 seats, the SPD, the Greens and Die Linke eight each, and five for the  BSW (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, a rightward split from Die Linke) . The key results can be summarised in four points:

Firstly: The CDU has suffered a historic defeat, plummeting 19.9 points to 17.2 per cent. This defeat is likely to have consequences for the federal government, a coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD and internal party disputes within the former.

Secondly: Die Linke is also a major loser, dropping 2.4 per cent to 8.6 percent, compared to 2021, and that was considered a bad result at the time. It is thus paying the price for failing to link the fight against the far right with clear opposition to the CDU, the federal government and the capitalist system. Instead of presenting itself as a fundamental alternative, it effectively offered itself as a vote-getter for a CDU-led government – not a particularly compelling reason to vote for it.

Thirdly: With 5.3 per cent, the BSW has just managed to secure a presence and could, of all things, become the kingmaker for the AfD before fading into insignificance at national level.

Fourthly: According to polls, the AfD’s success owes much to the mobilisation of 170,000 previous non-voters. The record turnout and the AfD’s success are therefore not separate phenomena – they go hand in hand.

Who voted for the AfD and why?

The AfD received a particularly high proportion of votes from manual workers (59 per cent). It also performed above average among white-collar workers, with 46 per cent. Among people in financial difficulties, it achieved 65 per cent! In other words, the AfD secured an absolute majority within the working class.

There are no separate polls on the voting behaviour of trade union members yet, but we can assume that here too the AfD won the most votes by a clear margin. Thus, we have to recognise that unlike all other parties, the AfD has managed to mobilise and channel the population’s dissatisfaction, insecurity and anger towards the government and the consequences of the ever-worsening social situation.

Unlike all other parties – including the Left Party – the AfD presents itself as a radical opposition to the government and ‘the system’. Of course, its ‘opposition’ is ultimately merely a façade, as with all right-wing populism. Like other right-wing figures such as Milei in Argentina, the AfD advocates an ultra-liberal economic programme and combines it with the racism  that is at the heart of its social programme. It accuses German imperialism of being concerned not with Germany, but with the world, Ukraine and refugees.

The fact that the government itself is taking massive action against refugees and migrants, and that support for Ukraine is provided solely in Germany’s economic and geostrategic interests, does nothing to change this. However – and this is of the utmost importance  – the AfD does not merely present itself as a right-wing outlet for discontent; it also presents itself as an alternative for the ruling class in Germany. And it is precisely amongst the small-scale capitalist strata, known in  Germany as the Mittelstand, that it is finding an increasing number of supporters.

And what does that mean?

With this election, the first AfD government in a federal province has become a real possibility. Although the BSW has ruled out a coalition with AfD, it has already made clear it would support a minority government on at least some issues. The AfD understandably rejects this, but it will be hoping for defectors from the CDU or the BSW, or even to persuade the BSW to enter a coalition after all.

Whether an AfD government comes to power or whether there will be a snap election, which the AfD would be well placed to win, remains to be seen. In any case, the German bourgeoisie (and the CDU) will regard Saxony-Anhalt as a test case to see whether the AfD proves to be a reliable champion of capital, and whether the AfD’s leader, Ulrich Siegmund, transforms himself into a sort of ‘mini-Meloni’.

Implications for federal politics

The election result deepens the political crisis within the CDU. Although Chancellor Merz will not resign, he emerges from the elections significantly weakened. The government, already on the back foot, will be further undermined.

This does not mean that it will change course. It will continue its all-out attack on wage earners, as well as its massive rearmament and militarisation. It will attempt to take the wind out of the AfD’s sails through further racist attacks, tougher security laws and a ‘law and order’ policy. In reality, this will drive more supporters towards the far right, who would rather vote for the racist, populist original than its pale imitation.

The economic crisis, militarisation and fears for the future will continue to drive voters towards the AfD, especially as it is not only the SPD and the Greens that are closely integrated into government policy. The trade unions, too, support the government through their policy of constant retreat in the name of social partnership and their co-management of mass redundancies, as in the case of Volkswagen which is demanding 100,000  workers go; indeed, they are one of its most reliable social pillars.

Their policy of class collaboration with capital paralyses the working class, preventing it from emerging as a force of resistance. At the same time, it deepens existing divisions and reinforces social chauvinism, nationalism and racism amongst wage earners. If the aim is to defend German companies on the global market against foreign competition, then it follows logically that jobs should be reserved for Germans first.

The fact that hundreds of thousands of wage earners vote for the AfD partly because of its overt German nationalism and racism – or at least accept these without hesitation – and that a significant section of the working class holds racist views, is ultimately also the result of a trade unionist and reformist ‘workers’ policy’ that regards German capital and corporations as ‘their own’ and does not see workers in ‘foreign’ countries and companies as  their class brothers and sisters

The disaster for the Left Party

The Left Party won a mere 112,541 votes, its worst-ever result in Saxony-Anhalt. No doubt there were factors such as tactical voting for the SPD and the Greens involved and some former voters probably went over to the BSW. But the entire election campaign was practically an invitation not to vote for Die Linke. It courted the CDU, practically imploring it to enter into talks about future cooperation after the elections.

If Die Linke is to learn anything from the AfD’s success, it should be the way the latter presents itself as an irreconcilable opposition. Faced with the right’s sham opposition, Die Linke must make a genuine, radical opposition policy – not only against the right, but against the system that produces it – the very essence of its politics and its programme.

Anyone who presents themselves merely as a party of ‘more reasonable’ co-administration, co-governance and tolerance of the status quo will perish in the process. The working class does not need yet another party that props up the CDU when it is in a tight spot. It needs a genuine, revolutionary class-based party – and Die Linke is a long way from that. It is not even a particularly militant party that stands up to German capital, its raison d’état, the government and its attacks. That is why an organised left-wing opposition is needed within Die Linke, and revolutionaries must fight within it for a revolutionary programme.

What is to be done?

To understand, as Spinoza counsels, is not an end in itself. The question is: what political conclusions do we draw from this?

A) An end to the call for unity amongst ‘democrats’

This political fiction forces Die Linke to sweep under the carpet precisely those contradictions that this capitalist system produces. Those who defend the status quo alongside the CDU, SPD and the Greens are leaving those who are disappointed with it – and who are turning away in disillusionment – to the AfD.

As socialists – and as members of the Left in the Left Party – we must therefore ask: Who are we actually fighting for? Why should disillusioned Green and SPD voters turn to the Left if, ultimately, we intend to govern alongside those parties anyway – and on their terms, no less? And how, above all, do we win over the millions of non-voters, workers and young people who have long since lost faith in this political system?

This means not backing down a single millimetre when it comes to anti-racism, women’s rights or LGBTIAQ rights. On the contrary: it means linking these struggles to a broader social perspective. Our aim cannot be merely to take one or two percentage points away from the AfD here and there. We must stand up for demands and goals for our entire class, and we must wage struggles in such a way that we can achieve them together – and in doing so, demonstrate a path towards breaking with the capitalist system itself.

B) Organising resistance – not just declaring opposition

Neither trivialising the issues nor conforming to the status quo will stop the AfD. The task of Die Linke must be to build resistance against its racist, social, authoritarian and military attacks and to play a central role in this.

This will only succeed if the response goes beyond empty phrases about tolerance and diversity. A socialist response is needed to tackle cuts, rising prices, the housing crisis and the deterioration of public infrastructure: not kicking those below us and squabbling over ever-smaller crumbs, but taking on those who profit from this system. Not pitting migrants against German workers, but waging the class struggle together against capital and the government.

To achieve this, Die Linke, amongst others, must use its grassroots support, its members and its elected representatives to build, unite and lead concrete struggles to victory. The response to the rise of the AfD cannot just be defence of the status quo against the right and stopping there. The organised counter-protests against the planned Elbit Systems arms factory in Sangerhausen show that this is possible.

It is up to us to show that there is an alternative to this state of affairs – and that, together, we have the power to fight for it. However, this is only possible if we are prepared to wage struggles and engage in confrontation.